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REVISITING AND REVISING THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE: LANE v. HALLIBURTON AND THE NEED
To ADOPT A CASE-SPECIFIC POLITICAL




The political question doctrine is as old as the judiciary itself. Cases
and controversies that are beyond the bounds of judicial competency are
not a new phenomenon. The courts may invoke the political question doc-
trine as a means of dismissing a case when the Constitution demands that a
political branch have ultimate discretion, or if the case is simply of a type
that is better suited to the halls of Congress or the office of the Executive
for resolution. Over time the doctrine has seen eras of widespread applica-
tion and periods of non-use. The Supreme Court has struggled over the
years to come up with a decisive method for determining the justiciability
of a given case, and there has developed distinct classes of cases which are
at the center of the political question controversy. These include cases in-
volving issues of foreign affairs,2 military affairs,' and republican-form-of-
government, or "Guaranty" Clause, claims.'
Recently, the courts have seen a surge in a new class of law suits that
has been drawn into the eddy of political question cases. With the rela-
tively recent phenomenon of private contractors providing logistical sup-
port to the United States military in foreign theaters of war, a new class of
cases has arisen which typically involves the injury, or even death of private
military contractor (hereinafter "PMC") employees, frequently alleged to
be due to the negligence of other employees or the contractor employer.
The overarching question in such cases is whether the judiciary is compe-
tent to resolve these which arise from private contractors who are perform-
ing military functions that would normally not be subject to judicial review.
1. The author would like to thank Professor Donald G. Campbell whose gracious support and
motivation made this Note possible. There were times during the writing of this Note that the author
questioned his ability, and certainly his understanding of the subject matter, but Professor Campbell's
eagerness and intellect proved contagious, and in the end helped push the author to write what he
hopes is a piece worthy of the journal it is published in. A special thank you to Mississippi College Law
Review for selecting this Note for publication. It has been a truly humbling experience from the
beginning.
2. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918).
3. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1973).
4. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946).
5. There are other cases that involve either a serviceman suing the PMC, or a PMC employee
suing the military, but those cases are frequently dealt with on other grounds, and are therefore outside
the scope of this Note.
219
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
On the one hand, there are hardly any issues as well-settled in the realm of
political questions as the exclusive legislative and executive authority over
military affairs.' The proponents for dismissing such suits based on politi-
cal question grounds contend that the civilian contractors are subject to
military orders, and thus should be viewed as an extension of the military
subject only to the authority of the political branches of government.7 Op-
ponents to this view argue persuasively, albeit simplistically, that the judici-
ary is the appropriate, indeed the only, forum for resolving civilian tort-
based claims.
This Note proposes that the latter view is the more favorable one. The
case under review is Lane v. Halliburton, a recent decision handed down in
the Fifth Circuit reversing three decisions by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas which dismissed as nonjusticiable
political questions three suits, brought by former employees of Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services, Inc. ("KBR") and their survivors for injuries sus-
tained as a result of the alleged negligence and fraud of KBR.' The first
section will lay out the facts of the case, followed by a discussion of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion. The Note will go on to discuss the background and
history of the political question doctrine, tracing its application all the way
back to Marbury v. Madison. Finally, this Note will analyze the Fifth Cir-
cuit's application of the factors developed over time that are generally used
to determine whether a case involves a political question, and proposes a
possible alternative method for determining the justiciability of PMC cases,
in the form of a balancing test - weighing prudential and constitutional
concerns.
II. FACTS
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States led a military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. To alleviate strains
on its forces, the United States Army awarded contracts to various private
companies to provide logistical support services to military forces operating
in Iraq. One of these contracts was awarded to KBR, a subsidiary of Halli-
burton, Inc.9 The contract, awarded under the authority of the Army's Lo-
gistic Civil Augmentation Program ("LOGCAP"), authorized the use of
civilian contractors to provide "selected services in wartime to augment
Army forces.""o Under LOGCAP, the contractors are not under the direct
supervision of the Army, but the Army is charged with the task of assessing
the risk of a given mission and making the determination of whether civil-
ian contractors are suitable for the mission." Specifically, under the LOG-
CAP contract with KBR at issue the Army was responsible for providing
6. See, e.g., Gilligan, 413 U.S. 1.
7. See Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc. 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 637 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
8. Lane v. Halliburton (Lane 2), 529 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2008).
9. Id.
10. U.S. Army Reg. 700-137, at 1-1 (Dec. 16, 1985).
11. U.S. Army Reg. 700-137, at 2-4(b), 3-1(a), 3-2(d).
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"security-related intelligence gathering and force protection for KBR con-
voys in Iraq."12 Military Task Orders 43 and 59 provided KBR's specific
tasks, including provision of transportation services."
Lane 2 is a consolidation of three cases, Lane v. Halliburton (Lane
1),14 Fisher v. Halliburton,'5 and Smith-Idol v. Halliburton.16 All three
cases were brought by civilian truck drivers who were in the employ of
KBR, and their spouses and dependents.17 The employees were civilian
truck drivers recruited by KBR to drive convoys in Iraq to aid in the re-
building effort in an environment that the defendants allegedly referred to
in the hiring process as "'100% safe . . . in . . . a fully secured location,
completely patrolled and protected by trained, skilled, and fully armed
United States personnel.""' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
"concealed the true fact that [they] were using [plaintiffs] to provide com-
bat support to the United States Military," and concealed the true number
of civilian contractor deaths in an effort to encourage the plaintiffs to sign
up.19 KBR circulated a memorandum that acknowledged a hostile working
environment, but that assured workers that "this does not mean your safety
will be compromised." 20 Plaintiffs contend that they relied on these and
other misrepresentations to their detriment by entering into, and remaining
in, the employ of KBR, and ultimately winding up in an ill-fated supply
convoy in Iraq.21
In April of 2004, multiple KBR convoys came under attack by Iraqi
insurgents resulting in the death of six KBR employees and serious injury
to eleven more.22 The plaintiffs alleged that KBR knew conditions were
unsafe but authorized the convoys anyway.23 The plaintiffs further alleged
that KBR misrepresented its, and its employees, ability to "halt work if
conditions in Iraq posed a threat to employee safety," referring to the
memo, supra, which stated "each of you has.. .authority to stop any activity
which you believe to be unsafe." 24 The plaintiffs contended that KBR
failed to stop the convoy and failed to inform employees that conditions
12. Lane II, 529 F.3d at 554.
13. Lane v. Halliburton (Lane 1), No. H-06-1971, 2006 WL 2796249, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
2006). A Task Order is something like a small no-bid contract awarded to the contractor, in this case
KBR, for performing specific functions at the discretion of the Army commander. See Brian M.
Hughes, Uses and Abuses of O&M Funded Construction: Never Build on a Foundation of Sand, 2005
ARMY LAWYER 1 (2005).
14. Id.
15. Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc. 454 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
16. Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 WL 2927685 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006).
17. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 554. The district court did not discuss the total number of plaintiffs, but
in the incident at issue, six men were killed, eleven were seriously wounded, and one was still missing at
the time of the litigation and presumed dead. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
18. Pl's Mem. in Opp. to Def's. Mot. to Dismiss at 16, Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (No. H-05-1731), 2008 WL 2975565.
19. Id.
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were unsafe, which would have afforded the plaintiffs the chance to opt out
of the mission. 25 None of the claims included the Army as a defendant.
The claims for recovery rested on numerous theories of state law in-
cluding fraud, fraud in the inducement, intentional concealment of material
facts, intentional misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy to commit fraud.26
The plaintiffs alleged that KBR had used deceptive and misleading infor-
mation in order to induce the plaintiffs into accepting employment, and
that the plaintiffs relied on that information and suffered damages as a
result. 27 A second set of state law claims, not based on fraud, included
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law.2 8 In addition,
the Lane 1 plaintiffs asserted negligence and gross negligence claims, and
some of the Fisher plaintiffs asserted wrongful death and survivorship
claims. 2 9 The plaintiffs in Smith-Idol and Fisher also alleged violation of
civil rights under § 19833o and violations, including conspiracy to commit
violations, of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.3 1
The defendants filed motions to dismiss in all three cases on the
grounds that, inter alia, the Army had control over the KBR convoys and,
accordingly, the decisions of KBR were so "interwoven" with the decisions
of the Army that the court lacked jurisdiction under the political question
doctrine. 3 2 Defendants also argued that they were entitled to immunity,
and alternatively that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Defense Base
Act,3 3 which provided an exclusive remedy for injuries to civilian contrac-
tors performing support services for the U.S. Army.34 The District Court
dismissed all three cases on political question grounds, never reaching the
latter issues. 35
In Fisher, the first of the three to be dismissed, the plaintiffs argued
first, that it was civilian, not military personnel bringing the claims; second,
that the decisions at issue were those of a civilian contractor (KBR), not
the military; and third, that KBR, not the Army, controlled the civilian
members of the convoys.3 6 The District Court concluded that the case
"[met] not one, but three of the formulations described in Baker v. Carr""







30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2009).
31. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 555; R.I.C.O., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)-(d) (2009)
32. Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc. 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
33. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq. (2009).
34. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 639 n.14; Def's Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dimiss at 4, Lane v.
Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. H-05-1731), 2005 WL 6177705.
35. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 639 n.14.
36. Id. at 641.
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (providing six factors for the courts to determine
whether a case is nonjusticiable on political question grounds).
38. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
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The court determined that the Executive and Legislative branches of
the government were given Constitutional authority and control in war and
foreign policy decisions and it was not the provenance of the court to ques-
tion those decisions. 9 In addition, the court held that it "lack[ed] the stan-
dards to hear this case" where the actions taken by KBR on April 9, 2004
were, "at best, the result of a joint effort between the defendants and the
Army," and, further, that it was the Army who was responsible for provid-
ing force protection, intelligence regarding which routes to take, the deci-
sion on which route to take, and the manner in which the drivers would
operate. In order to hear the case, the court determined, it would have had
to "substitute its judgment for that of the Army."4 0 The plaintiffs con-
tended, however, that KBR was required to "manage and direct their own
convoys," pointing to language in the Army publication, "Contractors on
the Battlefield."4 1 The court dismissed this argument citing numerous other
sections of the manual which tended to show that the Army was an "inte-
gral part of any decision to deploy and protect convoys."42
Under the third Baker formulation found applicable to the case, the
court determined that in order to hear the case it would have to answer
policy questions concerning the use of civilian contractors to augment mili-
tary personnel and, more narrowly, whether it was a wise decision to send
the convoys on that particular route that day, a task it was not prepared to
undertake.4 3 The Lane and Smith-Idol cases were subsequently dismissed
on the same grounds.
III. INSTANT CASE
Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit and the three cases were consol-
idated for review. Judge Southwick, writing for the majority, recognized
the difficulty that cases arising in war zones present, but nevertheless held
that at that point in the litigation it was impossible to tell whether the polit-
ical question doctrine would bar the claims. Based on the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, Judge Southwick thought it was at least plausible that they had
stated a claim, but the political question concerns still "loom[ed] . . . large
in the background." 4 4 Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed below,
the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for
further factual findings in order to determine whether an inextricable polit-
ical question exists.45
39. Id. at 640.
40. Id. at 642-43.
41. Id. at 642.
42. Id. at 643.
43. Id. at 644.
44. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008).
45. Id.
2232010]
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A. Overview
Judge Southwick made clear at the outset that the issue in the appeal
was "whether the Plaintiffs can prove any plausible set of facts that would
permit recovery against KBR without compelling the court to answer a
nonjusticiable political question."46 The lower court had found that the
Plaintiffs' claims implicated not one, but three of the Baker factors.4 7 How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiffs, concluded that on the surface it appeared that the civilian
Plaintiffs' "tort-based claims . . . against their civilian employers [could] be
separated from the political questions that loom so large in the back-
ground."4 8 The court emphasized the important difference between label-
ing a case non-justiciable and finding no federal jurisdiction, where the
former requires at least a cursory analysis of the merits of the case in order
to determine that judicial resolution is "inappropriate."4 9 The Baker analy-
sis requires a "discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of
the particular case" before a court may decline to hear it on the grounds of
non-justiciability.s0 The Fifth Circuit noted that the presence of even one
of the six Baker factors indicative of political questions could be sufficient
to render the case nonjusticiable." The court acknowledged that the back-
drop for the present case, United States military action in Iraq, represents
an arena where the political question doctrine has historically served "one
of its most important and traditional functions - precluding review of deci-
sions made by the Executive during wartime."5 2 However, the court cau-
tioned, not every question "touching foreign relations" invokes the
political question doctrine.53
1. Application of the Baker Formulations
The Fifth Circuit opined that the Baker factors "provide useful analyti-
cal guideposts in our analysis." 54 The court further stated, however, that
the purpose of the political question doctrine is to bar claims that threaten
the "separation-of-powers design" of the federal government, and thus a
determination as to the justiciability of a claim or claims is a "delicate exer-
cise in constitutional interpretation," not merely "plugging facts into fac-
tors."5 5 It should be noted that this statement could serve as a thesis
46. Id. at 557.
47. Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
48. Id. at 568.
49. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 557 ("Baker ... is not satisfied by 'semantic cataloguing' of a particular
matter as one implicating 'foreign policy' or 'national security.' Instead, Baker demands a 'discriminat-
ing inquiry"') (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 216).
50. Id. at 558 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 198) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 559 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; Can v. United States. 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.
1994)).
54. Id.
55. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 559 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211) (internal quotations omitted).
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statement for this note, and if the substance of the statement were prac-
ticed, perhaps this note need not be written. The reality, though, is that no
regardless of the rhetoric, most courts, including the Fifth Circuit, tend to
apply the Baker factors mechanically.
a. Textual Commitment
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's "textual commit-
ment" analysis, and determined that it was not, at this point, apparent that
every set of plausible facts that existed would "implicate particular author-
ity committed by the Constitution to Congress or the Executive."56 The
court gave examples of cases that do "implicate a textual commitment of
constitutional authority,"" but distinguished the instant case from each
one of them, noting that those cases suggested that the textual commitment
factor is "primarily concerned with direct challenges to actions taken by a
coordinate branch of the federal government."" This distinction is impor-
tant and requires that KBR show that the pending action would require
review of a military decision that is shielded from judicial review.59 But in
the case of an "ordinary tort suit" the textual commitment factor actually
weighs in favor of judicial resolution.6 0 The Fifth Circuit held that, viewed
in a favorable light, the plaintiffs' claims only implicated decisions taken by
KBR, not the military.61
b. Lack of Judicially Manageable Standards
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the second Baker factor was argua-
bly the most critical in the political question analysis in the instant case
because some of the allegations would require the court to at least consider
"what constituted adequate force protection for the convoys."6 2 Neverthe-
less, the court declined to accept the district court's determination that the
claims necessarily lacked a judicially manageable standard. The court's
analysis of the second Baker factor was necessarily linked with its analysis
of the elements of fraud and negligence claims in general or, as the court
56. Id. at 559-60.
57. Id. at 560 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (challenge to President's
decision to deploy troops on foreign soil); Dacosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1153-57 (2d Cir. 1973)
(challenge to President's decision to mine harbors of an enemy nation)). The court also noted that a
textual commitment has been found to exist in the following scenarios: Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
5-10 (suit seeking judicial oversight of National Guard training procedures); Pauling v. McNamara, 331
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (injunction of nuclear testing); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A
Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1978) ("resolution of a territorial dispute between sovereigns."). Id.
58. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 559.
59. Id. (citing McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359 (11th Cir. 2007)).
60. Id. (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1991)).
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 563 ("While the resolution of the plaintiffs' claims may require a court to adjust tradi-
tional tort standards to account for the [inhospitable environment] in which KBR operated, the court
will arguably have not need to develop any standards at all."). Id.
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put it, "[w]hat is the cart, and which is the horse, may be disputed, but we
seek to get the proper analytical alignment before we are finished."'
The court relied primarily on two cases to illustrate the operation of
the second Baker factor. 65  In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that a challenge to a refusal by the Secretary of State to "certify that
Japan's whaling practices were out of compliance with an international
treaty," where such certification was allegedly mandated by legislation, re-
quired no more than "applying . . . traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion." 6 6 The court contrasted Cannon where no judicial standard could be
found to "resolve a claim that a Senator's aide was illegally paid his federal
salary while engaging in campaign activity," because there was no statu-
tory, administrative or case law on the matter. 7 However, the present
cases, the court held, "primarily raised legal questions that may be resolved
by the application of traditional tort standards."
c. Nonjudicial Policy Determination
The Fifth Circuit also declined to accept the district court's determina-
tion that resolution of the plaintiffs' claims would necessarily "entail a judi-
cial pronouncement as to the wisdom of the military's use of civilian
contractors in a war zone," a determination reserved for legislative and
executive branches of government. 6 9 The court conceded that if the Plain-
tiffs' claims included allegations as to the reasonableness of using civilian
contractors in a war zone, then the political question doctrine would indeed
be implicated.70 However, the court stressed that all parties had accepted
that the "Executive acted within his discretionary authority to employ
KBR[,]" and that the district court would only be asked to "judge KBR's
policies and actions, not those of the military or Executive Branch.""
In conclusion, after analysis of the Baker factors, the Fifth Circuit was
not convinced that the district court would "inevitably" have to reevaluate
military decisions or oppose Executive or Legislative Branch policies.7
Application of "traditional tort standards" might permit the district court
64. Id. at 561.
65. Japan Whaling Assoc. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); United States ex rel. Jo-
seph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (1981).
66. Lane 2. 529 F.3d at 561 (citing Japan Whaling Assoc., 478 U.S. at 230) (internal quotations
omitted).
67. Id. (citing Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1379-80).
68. Id. at 563.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 563. The court acknowledged the National Defense Industrial Associa-
tion's concern expressed in an Amicus brief that any adverse decision against KBR might deter civilian
contractors from "entering military-related contracts in the future," but dismissed this concern stating
that any liability KBR might be found to have would most likely be based on torts "largely committed
in this country during the hiring process, with damages arising in a war zone," and that the impact that
might have on civilian companies contracting with the military is not a factor to consider in denying the
Plaintiffs a federal forum. Id. at 563 n.6 (citing Japan Whaling Assoc., 478 U.S. at 230).
72. Id.
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to "navigate ... this politically significant case without confronting a politi-
cal question.""
2. "Discriminating Inquiry into the Precise Facts and Posture"
The court undertook a detailed analysis of what the Plaintiffs needed
to prevail on each one of their state law claims which included fraud, con-
spiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence and gross
negligence.7 4 Having set out the "parameters of the political question doc-
trine" and defined the "nature and elements" of the plaintiffs' claims, the
court focused its analysis on the element of causation, deciding that this
one element was the most critical for a political question analysis.7 5
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the district court did not have the
benefit of a focused argument regarding the causation element, noting in
particular that it was only in a reply to plaintiffs' opposition to a motion for
dismissal that KBR even began to "focus its argument on the difficulty" the
plaintiffs would have proving the element of causation without forcing the
court to "second-[guess]" military actions.76 Even though KBR planned to
claim that it was the Army's failure to provide adequate security, and not
any action by KBR, that caused the injuries,7 the plaintiffs' counter argu-
ment that KBR could be liable despite the contribution to causation by an
intervening actor was sufficient to deny a motion to dismiss.78  The Fifth
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 564-65. Elements of fraud under Texas law are: "(1) that a material representation was
made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker
made the representation with the intent that the other party should act upon it; (5) the party acted in
reliance on the representation, and (6) the party thereby suffered injury." Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 564.
(citing In re First-Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001)). Intentional or fraudulent conceal-
ment claims have all of the elements of fraud with the additional requirement that "the particular
circumstances impose a duty on the party to speak and he deliberately remains silent." Id. (citing In re
Seigel, 198 S.W.3d 21, 29 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)). The final fraud-based claim of civil conspiracy requires
showing that "two or more persons combine 'to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a
lawful purpose by unlawful means."' Id. (citing Eagle Props., Ltd. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 912 S.W.2d
825, 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (elements of civil conspiracy are: "(1) two or more persons; (2) an end to
be accomplished; (3) meeting of the minds on the end or course of action; (4) one or more overt,
unlawful acts; and (5) proximately resulting in injury")). All of the Plaintiffs claimed intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, which requires a showing that the defendant: "(1) intentionally or recklessly
(2) engaged in conduct that was 'extreme and outrageous' (3) thereby causing the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress (4) and that distress was severe." Id. (citing Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Pack-
aging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999)). The Lane 1 Plaintiffs also claimed negligence and gross
negligence which require: "(1) a legal duty on the part of the defendant; (2) breach of that duty; and (3)
damages proximately resulting from that breach." Id. at 565 (citing Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 466 (5th Cir. 2003)). Gross negligence also requires an "extreme degree of
risk" and a "conscious indifference" by the negligent actor. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender,
968 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998)).
75. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 565.
76. Id. The Plaintiffs responded in a surreply that it was only KBR's actions that had to be
examined to determine causation. Id. These motions were filed three weeks before the final order was
entered. Id.
77. Id. at 566.
78. Id. The Restatement of Torts, which Texas courts have applied, states that "[i]f the likelihood
that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the
actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortuous, or criminal does not
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Circuit concluded that it could not say that "all plausible sets of facts that
would permit recovery from KBR would also raise a political question."7 9
As the court pointed out, the plaintiffs were in Iraq because KBR had al-
legedly drawn them there with promises of security and safety, and assum-
ing these allegations to be true, "causation would exist if KBR's
misrepresentations were a cause in fact of the plaintiffs' ultimate inju-
ries."so To determine causation under this theory, all the district court
would have to do is determine whether KBR knowingly made false assur-
ances to the Plaintiffs about the conditions in Iraq.s" Even if the inquiry
into KBR's knowledge about the conditions in Iraq necessarily required a
review of the information KBR received from the Army, the issue would
be what KBR did with the information, not the military's role in collecting
it. 2 Accordingly, the court concluded, there is a very good likelihood that
whether or not KBR made misrepresentations, those claims were sufficient
to try.8
The court cautioned that the negligence claims, however, would re-
quire a different kind of evidence and that these allegations "move precari-
ously close to implicating the political question doctrine."84 The claims
would require the Plaintiffs to prove that KBR breached a duty not to al-
low the convoys to proceed if the conditions were too dangerous. 5 None-
theless, at the present stage, it was too early to determine that any of the
claims necessarily implicated, and were inextricable from, the political
question doctrine.86 Furthermore, the court pointed out that federal courts
are perfectly capable of handling sensitive, classified information through
in camera review.
Next the court relied upon Smith v. Halliburton8 8 and Whitaker v. Kel-
logg, Brown & Root"' when it dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims.90 The court
distinguished Smith from the present cases on the grounds that the injuries
in Smith "occurred inside a military base after a suicide bomber penetrated
security checkpoints operated solely by the military." 9' The court distin-
guished Whitaker on the grounds that the claim in that case was brought by
a "soldier against private contractors whom he was ordered to escort in
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 449 (1965)).
79. Id. at 566-67; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448-49.
80. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 567 (citing Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985)
(emphasis in original)).






87. Id. at 568.
88. Smith v. Halliburton, No. H 4:06 cv 00462, 2006 WL 2521236, *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
89. Whitaker v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
90. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 568.
91. Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 568 (citing Smith, 2006 WL 2521326, at *4-6).
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Iraq." 92 The Fifth Circuit contradicted the district court's precedent with
precedent of its own which tended to show that tort claims against civilian
contractors do not necessarily raise inextricable political questions,9 3 none
of which was appealed. 94
The court concluded its opinion by recognizing the difficulty these
cases presented, and admitting that political and practical considerations
may very well impede judicial resolution. 5 However, the court contended
that with the benefit of the parties' "sharpened legal focus on the legal
requirements of the torts" it appeared as though the tort claims could be
separated from any political questions that might "loom . . . in the back-
ground." 96 The court conceded that further investigation into the facts may
very well require the district court to decide whether a political question
exists, but "[t]he litigation is not yet there, if it ever will be." 97
IV. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Introduction
The political question doctrine is a function of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine and federalism. As the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. Carr,
the Constitution divides the federal government into three equal branches:
legislative, executive and judicial. And if a power is vested in any one to
make a decision, that power may not be infringed upon by any of the other
branches.98
The political question doctrine is a patchwork of two hundred years of
legislation in which the Supreme Court seems to be constantly second-
guessing itself with regard to what questions are indeed beyond the reach
of the judiciary. One would suppose that after years of working and re-
working the doctrine the Court would have come up with something tangi-
ble that legal scholars and practitioners could wrap their minds around, but
what has resulted is anything but comprehensible, with the Supreme Court
itself unclear on whether some trademark political question issues are justi-
ciable or not.99
The crux of the argument is the fine line between a case which is
merely politically charged and one that is within the province of the politi-
cal, and which, if dealt with by the judiciary, would threaten the very idea
92. Id. (citing Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1279, 1281 n.4) (emphasis in original).
93. Id. (citing McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1357-65 (11th Cir. 2007);
Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374-76 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Potts
v. Dyncorp Int'l, LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248-54 (M.D. Ala. 2006)).




98. Baker, 369 U.S. at211.
99. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267 (2004) (overruling Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109 (1986) (holding that gerrymandering claims are not justiciable, on the grounds that in the eighteen
years since Bandemer held otherwise no discernable judicial standards had developed by which the
courts could resolve political gerrymandering claims)).
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of separation of powers.100 Indeed a "political case"1 o' presents no special
problem for the federal judiciary - they are decided all the time. 1 0 2 But
distinguishing a case that is merely political in nature from a case raising a
political question presents a unique problem, in that the court must, to a
certain extent, review the merits of the case to determine whether it has the
jurisdiction to hear the case.' 0 3
The basis of the political question doctrine is a separation of powers
concern, and cases raising issues that are constitutionally "committed to the
executive and legislative - 'the political' - departments"10 4 are seemingly
the easiest cases for political question treatment, yet they can be the most
difficult. It seems clear that when the text of the Constitution commits an
issue to a coordinate political branch of government, the judicial branch
does not have power to decide the case. 0 s However, the issue presented is
not always so clear. Consider the role of the Supreme Court, as Justice
Marshall stated it in Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . [and] if the
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply."10 6 Justice Marshall's no-
tion of judicial review is well-accepted today, but that concept is in constant
tension with the political question doctrine, and this causes the back-and-
forth debate on politically sensitive issues.
This section will expound on the political question doctrine, and in so
doing try to make sense out of what seems to be an intricate web of cases
that do not adhere to a single coherent approach to these questions. This
section begins with a discussion of the very early history of the political
question doctrine as Justice Marshall established it in Marbury v. Madison.
Following that is a brief discussion of how the doctrine, and the court's
interpretation of it, have evolved over time. This section ends with a look
at the canonical case of Baker v. Carr, and the sea change in political ques-
tion jurisprudence that followed.
100. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 ([T]he "doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions,'
not one of 'political cases."').
101. Id.
102. E.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding a case that affected the outcome of the
presidential election).
103. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. This attribute of the political question doctrine gives rise to what one
scholar has coined the "faux" political question doctrine. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life
of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 441, 445-48 (Winter 2004) (arguing that
in many, if not most, cases that are dismissed for want of justiciability, the court made a determination
that the act in question was within the bounds of Constitutional authority, and thus a decision on the
merits was made).
104. Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918).
105. See, e.g., id. ("The conduct of foreign relations of our government is committed by the Con-
stitution to. . . 'the political' departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
106. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78.
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B. The Early Years
In the early years of the Supreme Court the political question doctrine,
as such, was virtually non-existent, save for an isolated pronouncement in
Ware v. Hylton where the Court held nonjusticiable the issue of federal
political officials' determinations as to whether a foreign nation had
breached a treaty.10 7 This expression of the Court was a precursor to the
much more clearly pronounced doctrine of judicial restraint in areas ex-
pressly delegated to political branches of the government by the Constitu-
tion in Marbury v. Madison.
1. Foundation
a. Marbury v. Madison
Justice John Marshall announced very clearly the role of the Supreme
Court in Marbury, as well as the limits of that role, in what was perhaps the
first definitive expression of the political question doctrine. 10s "The prov-
ince of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which
they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court." 0 ' Thus, the Court introduced the notion that the separation of
powers upon which our federal government was founded precluded judicial
review of certain matters where the Constitution vests authority in a coor-
dinate political branch to decide. Nevertheless, when a political branch
acts in a manner that affects individual rights, it is the role, and duty, of the
court to determine what those rights are and protect them.110
The Supreme Court followed up its decision in Marbury with a similar
recognition of the untouchable executive power in Martin v. Mott"', stop-
ping short, though, of declaring the case nonjusticiable. In Mott, the Court
held that the power granted to the President by an act of Congress, to call
forth the militia when the nation was either under attack or facing an immi-
nent threat of attack, was plenary and not subject to review by any other
branch of government.1 2 The Court further held that there is a presump-
tion the actions of a political branch, acting under the color of a constitu-
tional duty, are done in furtherance of that duty, absent a showing to the
contrary.' 13
107. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
108. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78.
109. Id. at 170.
110. Id. at 166.
111. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827).
112. Id. at 29-31 (holding that the power granted by Congress to the President to call forth the
militia was not subject to review, judicial or otherwise, due to the very nature of the power which was to
be used in cases of sudden emergency or in cases where the very existence of the Union was at stake).
113. Id. at 33 ("Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to his duty, until the contrary
is shown; and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favourably [sic.] applied to the chief magistrate of
the Union. It is not necessary to aver, that the act which he may rightfully do, was so done."). See
23120101
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b. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Another early application of the political question doctrine was in the
area Indian affairs. While not expressly holding that the case presented a
political question, the Supreme Court, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, dis-
missed a complaint seeking to enjoin the governor of the state from enforc-
ing discriminatory laws.1 4 The Court foreshadowed the prudential strain
of the political question doctrine, noting that "the propriety of such an in-
terposition by the court . .. savours [sic] too much of the exercise of politi-
cal power to be within the proper province of the judicial department.""1 '
2. The Guaranty Clausell 6
Some forty plus years after the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v.
Mott, a similar case - Luther v. Borden - arose, calling on the court to
determine which of two groups claiming to be the recognized government
of the state of Rhode Island was the legitimate one." It was an action in
trespass brought by a man who had been arrested in his home on suspicion
of plotting to overthrow the government, which he claimed had been legiti-
mately ousted by the people, who had adopted a new constitution."" The
Court declined to make a determination as to which government was the
lawful one at the time the actions giving rise to the complaint took place.119
In a decision by Justice Story, the Court, in no uncertain terms, laid
out a substantial foundation for the political question doctrine:
Much of the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned
upon political rights and political questions, upon which the
court has been urged to express an opinion. We decline do-
ing so. The high power has been conferred on this court of
passing judgment upon the acts of State sovereignties, and
Robert J. Pushaw, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebutta-
ble Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1165, 1201 (May 2002) (criticizing the Baker approach and
suggesting that the courts have shifted away from the rebuttable presumption approach, favoring in-
stead an "ahistorical" approach relying on "totally discretionary multifactor approach" that is, at best,
inconsistent).
114. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 14 (1831).
115. Id. at 15. In a concurring opinion, Justice Johnson noted the strong political nature of the case
in two regards: first, the complaint exhibited a state of war between two sovereigns, and second, the
plaintiffs had sought redress with the Executive branch, and not satisfied with the result, sought to have
the courts compel another branch of the government to take action which it had declined to take based
on policy considerations, which it is not the province of the court to second guess. Id. at 20-22 (John-
son, J., concurring). Justice Baldwin also concurred, reiterating and emphasizing the point that the
neither Congress nor the Executive, having the power under the Constitution to do so, had recognized
the Indians as a sovereign nation. and a foreign state could not be created by judicial construction
without violating the Constitution. Id. at 47-48 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
116. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (provides that the federal government shall guarantee to every state
in the union a republican form of government, and protect each of them against invasion, and on the
application of the legislature or of the executive, in the event the legislature cannot be convened,
against domestic violence).
117. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
118. Id. at 34-35.
119. Id. at 44.
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of the legislative and executive branches of the federal gov-
ernment, and of determining whether they are beyond the
limits of power marked out for them respectively by the
Constitution of the United States. This tribunal, therefore,
should be the last to overstep the boundaries which limit its
own jurisdiction. And while it should always be ready to
meet any question confided to it by the Constitution, it is
equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of
action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions
which properly belong to other forums.12 0
The Court made several points. The judiciary does not have the power
to recognize a state or foreign government.1 2 1 The judiciary does not pos-
sess the qualifications to prescribe voter qualifications or protect "political
rights."' 22 And finally, the "Guaranty Clause" of the Constitution necessa-
rily vests in Congress the power determine which government is the legiti-
mate one for the purpose of determining whether or not it is republican in
form,123 and when intervention is necessary to carry out the "guaranty."' 24
Moreover, Congress could, and did, assign the power to the Executive to
make the decision when to intervene to protect the states.125 The Act of
February 28, 1795, placed in the Executive the power to decide which
"body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he
can act,"1 26 much the same as Article IV places the implicit power in Con-
gress to decide which "body of men" constitutes the government to deter-
mine whether it is republican.
The Court analogized the President's recognition of a state govern-
ment to his recognition, and sole power to recognize, the government of
foreign nations, which recognition "is always recognized in the courts of
justice."12 7 In addition to the clear textual commitment of the matter to
the Legislative branch (and by act of Congress to the Executive branch),
the Court alluded to a prudential concern holding that no court with
knowledge of the President's recognition of a government, domestic or for-
eign, would have been justified in recognizing the opposing government. 12 8
120. Id. at 39.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 35.
124. Id. at 36 ("In case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any
other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.")
(internal quotations omitted).
125. Id.; U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4 (The federal government "shall protect each of [the states]
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can-
not be convened) against domestic violence.").
126. Luther, 48 U.S. at 36.
127. Id.
128. Luther, 48 U.S. at 44.
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The Baker Court would later term this particular prudential factor a "lack
of respect due coordinate political branches. "129
3. Expansion of the Political Question Doctrine
a. From Guaranty Clause to Apportionment
The Court in Luther declined to decide the case, but did not expressly
hold all Guaranty Clause cases to be nonjusticiable."'3 Indeed several
cases in which Article IV was at issue were decided after Luther without so
much as a mention of the political question doctrine."'1 Application of the
doctrine grew over time, though.
Beginning in 1912 with the case of Pacific States v. Oregon'3 2 a definite
trend emerged in applying the political question doctrine to Guaranty
Clause claims.' The expanded application included a number of cases
challenging state legislative apportionment schemes. Most notably, in
Colegrove v. Green the Court affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging
that the federal congressional districts in Illinois were unconstitutional due
to the legislature's failure to revise the districts despite "great changes, dur-
ing more than a generation, in the distribution of [the state's] popula-
tion. . . ."I" A plurality held that a "[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a
republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the
courts."3 ' The holding in Colegrove was followed, virtually blindly, for the
better part of two decades.
129. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
130. Luther, 48 U.S. at 45 (declining to decide "to what extent, nor under what circumstances, [the
power to declare martial law] may be exercised by a State"). See Pushaw, supra note 113, at 1194
(suggesting that this qualifying statement by the Court would have been entirely unnecessary if its
intention was to hold all Guaranty Clause claims to be nonjusticiable).
131. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 139 U.S. 449 (1891) (holding that a state's denial of the right of
suffrage to women was not a violation of the Guaranty Clause); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506
(1897) (holding that, although normally a legislative function, determination of the boundaries of a
municipal corporation by the courts does not violate the Guaranty Clause).
132. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912) (holding challenge to a state
tax nonjusticiable because the court found that the claim challenged the "state as a state" and not the
"tax as a tax," where the taxpayer alleged that the state constitution amendment providing for the
initiative to violate the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution).
133. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915) (declaring nonjusticiable a claim arising
under the Guaranty Clause challenging Nebraska's delegation of legislative authority to the courts to
form a drainage district); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930)
(declaring nonjusticiable a Guaranty Clause claim arising out of an Ohio state constitutional provision
that no law shall be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least all but one of the
judges).
134. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
135. Id. at 556 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
[sic.] Senators")); Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 118). In a concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge expressed his
doubt that the textual commitment alone was sufficient to render the case nonjusticiable, rather the
possibility for "pitch[ing the] court into delicate relation to the functions of state officials and Congress"
coupled with the lack of time remaining for the petitioners to get the relief they sought warranted
dismissal on the grounds of nonjusticiability. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 565-66 (Rutledge, J., concurring). It
is worth noting that Justice Rutledge, along with the three dissenting Justices, found no overriding
textual commitment that would have barred adjudication on the merits, and, save for equitable and
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b. Foreign Affairs
Although recognized from the very beginning as one of the central
underpinnings of the political question doctrine, beginning in the early
Twentieth Century, the political nature of questions touching on foreign
affairs began to routinely invoke the doctrine. If the presumption in the
early Supreme Court was in favor of judicial review, 1 3 6 then the presump-
tion in the Supreme Court from 1900 through 1962 was generally one of
judicial restraint in the arena of foreign policy, an arena which the Court
declared was wholly committed to the Legislative and Executive
branches.13 7
Early on, the Court solidified the notion that the Executive branch is
vested with the sole power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs free from
the prospect of judicial review, specifically holding that entering treaties
with foreign nations and the continuing vitality of those treaties are matters
strictly within the spheres of Legislative and Executive powers.138 Accord-
ingly, the Court declined to decide whether an extradition treaty entered
into with Prussia continued to be valid and enforceable upon the incorpo-
ration of Prussia into the German Empire.139
In 1918, the Supreme Court held in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. that
the determination and recognition of a foreign sovereign is a political ques-
tion.140 In so holding, the Court made clear that "the conduct of the for-
eign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative - 'the political' - departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. "141 The Court added a
prudential argument based on long-standing act-of-state doctrine, which es-
sentially precludes adjudication of the legitimate action of independent for-
eign governments, suggesting that the redress of grievances concerning the
acts of foreign sovereigns lies with the political branches.142
A similar limitation on judicial review was recognized in Chicago &
Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corporation where the Court
prudential concerns, Justice Rutledge might have sided with the dissenting Justices, thus comprising a
four person majority out of the seven participating Justices. See id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id.
at 567 (Black, J., dissenting).
136. See generally Pushaw, supra note 113.
137. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
138. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288-89 (1902) (citing Doe v. Braden, 16 How 635 (1853)
(declaring that prudential concerns, including limiting the President's efficacy in conducting the nation's
foreign affairs, warranted withholding from judicial review the question of whether a foreign head of
state had the power to ratify a treaty under that nation's constitution)).
139. Id.
140. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (dismissing an action in replevin brought to recover hides that the
plaintiff claimed had been unlawfully appropriated by a Mexican revolutionary general as a military
"contribution" and subsequently sold to the defendant; the Court noted that the United States had
subsequently recognized the revolutionary general as the de facto president).
141. Id. at 302.
142. Id. at 303.
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held that the President's denial of an application for authorization to en-
gage in overseas and foreign air transportation was beyond judicial re-
view. 143 The Court came to this conclusion based on two factors, the first
being Congressional delegation of the power to the Executive to authorize
or deny applications, and the second being the President's decisions with
respect to foreign policy derived from the Constitution itself, with the
courts possessing "neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility" to call into
question such decisions.144
c. Congressional Self-Governance
The Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to self-regulate
early on in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, a case dealing with a challenge to
Congress' passage of the Act of October 1, 1890, vesting in the President
the power to suspend the free introduction, and exportation, of certain
commodities, including sugar, coffee and tea, upon a determination that
another country imposed unequal or unreasonable duties on the products
of the United States.145 The Act, it was contended, was not appropriately
listed in the journals as passed, and as such should be considered invalid.146
The Court held that Congress had the power to determine the manner in
which the journals were kept, and was in the best position to protect itself,
viz. power to enact preventative and protective legislation; and absent a
showing that Congress had enacted a law in a manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, the presumption favored evidence of the proper legislative
process as conclusive with regard to the law's enactment.147 Whether or
not this treatment technically counts as adjudication on the merits or dis-
missal for want of justiciability is a matter that is fairly debatable, and an
issue that will likely not be resolved any time soon. 148
The Supreme Court has shown similar deference to Congress in mat-
ters regarding Commerce Clause legislation.149  Though such cases were
143. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1948).
144. Id. at 111.
145. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).
146. Id. at 672-73.
147. Id. The Court expressly declined to decide to what extent the validity of enacted legislation
would be affected by failure to enter it in the rolls, similar to Luther, in that the Court was apparently
suggesting that not all Congressional self-governance claims are nonjusticiable. Id. at 671; Luther v.
Borden,, 48 U.S. 1, 45 (1849).
148. See Seidman, supra note 103. As mentioned in a prior note, Seidman suggests that there is a
"faux" political question doctrine, the one set out by Justice Marshall in Marbury where the ultimate
question is the constitutionality of a particular act by a political department. Id. If that act is fairly
within the constitutional authority bestowed upon a political department, the Court may not intervene,
but if that act be repugnant to the Constitution, then "entire confidence" was not placed in said depart-
ment and the political question doctrine fails to shield it from judicial review. Id. In other words, the
"faux" doctrine avoids the merits only by deciding them. Id. Such a doctrine presents a major stum-
bling block in the path of academic consideration of the political question doctrine.
149. For a modern example of the Commerce Clause cases, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), where the Supreme Court upheld the federal ban on possession and cultivation of marijuana for
personal use, holding that in "assessing the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. the Court
need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect inter-
state commerce in fact, but only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding."
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not dismissed on political question grounds, it can fairly be extrapolated
that the application of the "rational basis" test for legislation affecting the
rights of citizens, under the auspices of the power to regulate commerce,
speaks of a general stance of recognizing the power vested in Congress as
plenary and beyond review, so long as Congress' basis for acting in a given
situation is rational. The correlation to the political question cases is the
underlying rationale that the political branches are vested with certain
powers, and absent a showing that Congress or the Executive acted in a
manner that is clearly inconsistent with the constitution, the judiciary will
give deference. 5 o
d. Military Authority
The Court has also recognized as nonjusticiable cases calling into ques-
tion the powers of Congress and the President to control the Armed Forces
- perhaps the purest form of political questions. In Ex parte Quirin1 5 1 the
Court held that military tribunals were an appropriate exercise of the Con-
stitutional authority under Article I, § 8 and Article II, § 2 to protect the
nation, raise armies, declare wars and enforce laws.152 When the validity of
a military tribunal was once again called into question in Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, the Court held that "[i]t is not for us to say whether these prisoners
were or were not guilty of a war crime, or whether if we were to retry the
case we would agree to the findings of fact or the application of the laws of
war made by the Military Commission . . . 'if the military tribunals have
lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to
judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision . . . ."153
The Court further declared that "it is not the function of the Judiciary to
entertain private litigation . .. which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or
the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces
abroad or to any particular region.154
4. The Turning Point - Baker v. Carr
It can fairly be said that from the turn of the century until the Supreme
Court decided Baker v. Carr, there was a general trend in the Supreme
Court toward adopting a presumption favoring the autonomy of the politi-
cal branches and declining to decide cases calling into question discretion-
ary decisions made by the branches under the authority of Constitutional
provisions. 1 55
150. See Pushaw, supra note 113; see also Seidman, supra note 103.
151. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1947).
152. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12, 13; U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; 317
U.S. 1, 1 (1942).
153. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786-87 (1950).
154. Id. at 789.
155. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
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That trend reversed course in 1962 with the Court's decision in
Baker.15 6 A plurality decided an apportionment case on the merits in the
face of weighty precedents like Luther and Colegrove. The case involved
an Equal Protection claim challenging a Tennessee apportionment statute
that allegedly "arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in
the Senate and House without reference to any logical or reasonable
formula whatever."15 7 The Court, after an exhaustive discussion of the his-
tory of the political question doctrine, proposed a list of six factors, the
presence of any one of which present in a case could be sufficient to war-
rant dismissing the complaint as nonjusticiable.1 8 The six factors are a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving [a claim]," "the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion," "the impossibility of the court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government," "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made," and "the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." 159
The Court found none of the factors present in Baker and remanded to the
district court for decision on the merits. 160
Somehow the Court avoided overruling precedent and reconciled
Baker with Colegrove by finding that the controlling view in Colegrove v.
Green was that the case should be dismissed for want of equity, not for lack
of justiciable subject matter.16 1 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas
expressed his view that the political question doctrine was much narrower
than the case law would suggest.162 Nevertheless, he confirmed the general
principle behind political questions, to wit that "some questions [are] be-
yond judicial competence ... [such as when] the performance of a 'duty' is
",163left to the discretion and good judgment of an executive officer ....
The dissents in Baker were strong, insisting that the dominant concern
in this case was the lack of judicial standards for fashioning a remedy.164
Justice Frankfurter argued that Baker was little more than a Guaranty
Clause claim masquerading under a different label," and admonished the
Court for attempting to create judicial competence where it is wanting sim-
ply by "invoking one clause of the Constitution rather than another."165
The dissents were probably well founded, viewed in light of the destiny of
the political question doctrine after the decision in Baker. The federal
156. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
157. Id. at 187.
158. Id. at 217.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 237.
161. Id. at 234.
162. Id. at 246 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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courts, usually citing Baker, began a march down justiciable lane, casting
aside old notions of nonjusticiability based on federalism and separation-
of-powers concerns, and declaring virtually every controversy to be
justiciable.
C. Post-Baker and the Questioning of Political Questions
After Baker, the political question doctrine became virtually un-
recognizable. Scholars can only seem to agree on one thing with regard to
the doctrine, and that is that Baker offers very little help in determining
which questions are political questions.' 66 A look at some of the case law
that has developed at the Supreme Court level over the last forty years will
be useful to illustrate the profound effect Baker had on the political ques-
tion doctrine.
1. Once Political, Always Political
The Supreme Court has only dismissed a few cases as political ques-
tions since Baker. First, in Gilligan v. Morgan the Court dismissed a claim
seeking an injunction to prevent the Governor of Ohio from prematurely
calling out National Guard troops to civil disorders, and an injunction to
restrain Guard troops from violating students' civil rights."' Affirming the
general notion that military issues are nonjusticiable, the Court held that it
"would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmen-
tal action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political
branches directly responsible - as the Judicial Branch is not - to the electo-
ral process[;] [m]oreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmen-
tal activity in which the courts have less competence [than] [t]he complex
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equip-
ping, and control of a military force . . . ."168
The Court also confirmed the political nature of congressional self-
governance claims in Nixon v. United States, where a former district judge,
Walter Nixon, challenged the Senate impeachment proceedings.169 The
text of the Constitution itself commits the sole power to the Senate to try
166. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 113 (proposing that Baker and its progeny have abandoned, and
should return to, the "rebuttable presumption" approach to political questions); Jared S. Pettinato,
Executing the Political Question Doctrine, 33 N. Ky. L. REV. 61 (2006) (proposing that Baker's frame-
work is unnecessary and cumbersome; and a much simpler framework boiling the issue down to two
considerations, discretionary power in the political branches and lack of judicial competence to decide
cases where political branches have exceeded their discretion, is a more preferable approach).
167. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 2 (1973).
168. Id. at 10.
169. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236-237 (1993); contra Seidman, supra note 103 (sug-
gesting that the Court actually dismissed the case on the merits, having found that Congress did not
exceed its Constitutional authority with respect to holding impeachment trials).
2392010]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
all impeachments.o7 0 The Court relied not only on this textual commit-
ment, but also on the grounds that judicial review of impeachment pro-
ceedings in the Senate brought to the fore concerns of a lack of finality and
a lack of judicially manageable standards. 1
Finally, and most recently, the Court held that political gerrymander-
ing cases are nonjusticable in Vieth v. Jubelirer, overruling a prior decision
to the contrary. 1 72 With this decision the Court recognized that eighteen
years of "judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it" had passed
since Davis v. Bandemer had held, for the first time, political gerrymander-
ing cases justiciable."' Vieth serves as a good example of the swings in the
political question doctrine jurisprudence. An issue that was thought of as
being a political question was declared justiciable, only to revert back a
mere eighteen years later. This shows not only the political pressures that
so obviously manipulate the jurisprudence, but also the inconsistencies of
the Baker standard and the potential for regression rather than
progression.
2. Justiciable Politics
Perhaps one of the more well-known cases limiting the political ques-
tion doctrine is Powell v. McCormackl74 , decided fairly close on the heels
of Baker, and perhaps it was the more influenced by it for that reason. The
Supreme Court held in Powell that the textual commitment by the Consti-
tution of the right to judge qualifications of House members'7 5 is specifi-
cally limited to those qualifications listed in the Constitution.7 6 The
Court's dismissal of the Baker factors was striking.' 7 7 The Court then de-
clared that the "lack of respect" factor was not relevant because it is the
duty of the Court to interpret the Constitution, which interpretation is fre-
quently at odds with that of other branches; that the "judicially manageable
standards" are self evident in the Constitutional interpretation; and that
there was no danger of "multifarious pronouncements" because it is the
responsibility of the Judiciary to be the ultimate interpreter of the Consti-
tution.17 8 Whether the Court was assuming too much with regard to its
responsibility is not a matter here under consideration, but the decision in
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 6
171. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
172. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (overruling Davis v. Bandemere, 478 U.S. 109
(1986)).
173. Id. at 281 (referring to the courts' inability to develop a workable standard by which to re-
solve gerrymandering cases).
174. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
175. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
176. Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 549-50 (holding that the "lack of respect" factor was not relevant; the "manageable
standards" were self-evident in Constitutional interpretation; and there was no danger of "multifarious
pronouncements" because the Court's role is to interpret the Constitution).
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Powell shows the ability of the very Court that created the doctrine to de-
stroy it. What is under consideration is the clear manipulation of the Baker
factors, a problem that the factors no doubt lend themselves to. 179
D. Conclusion
Whether the political question doctrine is undergoing another trans-
formation either in application or interpretation is not the point of this
note. The fact is, the underlying separation-of-powers concerns ensure that
there will probably always be a political question doctrine. The concern
lies in the judiciary's use of the doctrine as an escape hatch; a problem
which was compounded by the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the six
factor test with its vague prudential factors that lower courts can seemingly
find present or not, depending on how they feel about a given case and its
possible political ramifications.
Despite the obvious concerns about the unequal application of the
doctrine, it does have its practicality. Including the instances discussed
above, there are a few more that legitimately fall within the political ques-
tion category, such as the power to declare war and/or engage in hostili-
ties,1 so and the power to plan for and hold elections,s' where the judiciary
is either expressly prohibited from passing judgment or simply incompetent
to do so. What we are probably seeing today is a return to more of a pre-
sumption of judicial review, tempered, nevertheless, by cases like Lane 1
that show the judiciary's unwillingness to decide a politically sensitive case,
and Lane 2 that shows judiciary's reluctance to make a definitive holding
and set a proper precedent for justiciability in PMC cases.
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Fifth Circuit reached a palatable decision in Lane v. Hal-
liburton, it did not go far enough and deal with the underlying problem.
Application of the six Baker factors in the political question analysis has
yielded different results on the same, or substantially similar, sets of facts.
The central issue with the Baker test is the breadth and fungibility of the
factors, and the fact that "the inextricableness of any [one of the factors
could] reveal the existence of a political question." 182 Thus, courts are
given wide latitude to determine not to decide cases that, often times, are
properly before the court. In Lane 2 it is not the result reached that is
disputed, but rather the method in arriving at that result and the failure to
adopt a presumption of justiciability in cases brought by civilian workers
179. See Pushaw, supra note 113, at 1175 (suggesting that the Baker factors "cannot meaningfully
distinguish political questions from justiciable legal ones.").
180. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding that the power to declare war
rests with Congress, and by implication the power of the Executive to engage in hostilities, when ac-
companied by implicit approval from Congress, but absent an affirmative declaration of war, is beyond
judicial review).
181. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
182. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 560 n.4 (5th Cir. 2008).
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injured in a war zone whose only redress is with the court. Reading Baker
and its predecessors, one wonders from what fabric the Supreme Court
wove the six factors, and whether it may be time to reconsider their
functionality.
This note proposes a reevaluation of the Baker approach in light of,
and with respect to, cases that arise from injuries suffered by civilians at the
hands of PMCs. First, it is necessary to take a look at how the military has
changed, and the consequences for the political question doctrine. Next,
this note will discuss the general limitations of the Baker factors, as well as
the specific problems created by the factors with respect to Lane 2 and
other PMC cases. Finally, this note will discuss the need to adopt a more
case-specific approach for determining the existence of a political question
in PMC cases - using the factors, but limiting their role and integrating
them into a more equitable analysis.
A basic recognition and understanding of how the military has
changed is necessary before proceeding any further.
A. The New Military and Its Implications for the
Political Question Doctrine
Historically, the political question issues and cases arising from the
conduct of the armed forces have involved the military performing military
functions. The argument in favor of dismissing claims dealing with military
affairs is premised on that function being one of defense. In Parker v.
Levy, considering, and upholding, the validity of a provision in the Code of
Military Justice, the Supreme Court stated that "the military is, by neces-
sity, a specialized society separate from civilian society . . . [and that] [t]he
differences between the military and civilian communities result from the
fact that 'it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise.""as The Court went on to suggest that
what may be constitutionally permissible within military society is judged
by a more lenient Constitutional standard than that which is permissible in
civilian society due to the nature of the military and its function.184 The
notion that the military is subject to a different standard of law is consistent
with court decisions declining jurisdiction on the grounds that there is a
lack of judicial standards, which, together with a textual commitment are
the most common reasons for declaring military issues nonjusticiable.'85
183. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 734 (1974) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
184. Id. at 758 (noting "[tlhe fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity
forimposition of discipline" as justifications for affording a certain constitutional leniency to military
conduct even though the same conduct in civilian society might be considered violative of individual
rights).
185. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) ("courts are ill-equipped to determine
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have") (quoting
Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. at 10 (the "complex[,] subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equip-
ping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments"); Aktepe v. United
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But if the function of the military changes, then the premise on which the
political question argument rests is undercut.
The armed forces now engage not only in combat operations, but
peacekeeping and rebuilding efforts, as well. Moreover, warfare itself has
changed, such that we are now engaged in a war without borders, and
seemingly without end. - i.e. the "war on terror." Thus, while the Armed
Forces add civilian contractors to the ranks to aide in rebuilding nations
that have been ravaged by war, combat operations are still being carried
out.186 With the integration of civilians into military society comes a diffi-
culty in discerning which aspects of civilian society are subject to the more
liberal civilian rules - and strict Constitutional scrutiny - and which aspects
are subject to the more strict military rules - and lenient Constitutional
scrutiny. The problem is compounded when confronted with the fact the
peaceful and combat missions may be intertwined.8 7
Halliburton, and other government contractors, have sought to have
the political question doctrine expanded to include claims by and against
civilian contractors.s88 The result of continued expansion of the scope of
the political question doctrine in this way would be untenable - essentially
creating a windfall for government contractors to the detriment of their
employees, and at the expense of the taxpayers. 189 Setting a precedent of
political question treatment for PMC cases creates the risk of eventually
granting the PMCs immunity from suit, in the same way the United States,
as the sovereign, is immune from suit in many circumstances including suits
brought by military servicemen.190 The courts need to be reminded that
the PMCs are still civilians, regardless of their connection with the military,
and absent a significant national security interest in the PMCs immunity
from suit in rare instances, the PMCs should not enjoy the equivalent of
sovereign immunity. It's as if the courts would have the PMCs treated as
the third political branch of the government. If Constitutional principles
are to be maintained and justice served, the "civilian branch" of the armed
States, 105 F.3d 1400, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997) ("courts lack standards with which to assess whether rea-
sonable care was taken to achieve military objectives while minimizing injury and loss of life.").
186. This phenomenon, of war and rebuilding without a decisive victory first, was exactly what the
plaintiffs in Lane 2 alleged to have fallen victim to, claiming that KBR had hired them for peaceful
operations, but ended up using them in combat operations. See generally Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d
548, 545-55 (5th Cir. 2008).
187. See John L. Watts, Differences Without Distinctions: Boyle's Goverment Cotractor Defense
Fails to Recognize the Critical Differences Between Civilian and Military Plaintiffs and Between Military
and Non-Military Procurement, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 647, 648 (2007) (Supreme Court has justified "differ-
ent rules for civilians and service members because of the constitutional allocation of military control to
the political branches").
188. See generally Lane 2, 529 F.3d 548; McMahon, 502 F.2d 1331; Smith v. Halliburton, No. H 06-
0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006); Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., No. H-05-
01853, 2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006).
189. One of Halliburton's defenses was that the government was the source for the plaintiff's
redress, and to uphold that notion would be to make the government, and hence the taxpayers, solely
liable for Halliburton's wrongdoings. See Lane 2, 529 F.3d at 566.
190. See Watts, supra note 187, at 653-54 (discussing the development of the Feres immunity doc-
trine, which excepts from the Federal Tort Claims Act claims brought by military members for injuries
incident to their service).
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forces should maintain its civilian rights, including the right to seek redress
in the courts of the several states or of the United States when appropriate.
Maintaining these rights starts with an acceptance that Baker must be
reconsidered.
B. Where Baker Falls Short
The Supreme Court drew on hundreds of years of precedent in creat-
ing the list of factors for which Baker has gained so much notoriety. All of
the cases in which the political question doctrine has been correctly applied
share a common aspect: if the issue were left to the judiciary for resolution,
it could potentially compromise the political structure laid out by the fram-
ers.'9 1 Therefore the factors the Baker Court extracted from precedent re-
flect this concern and are best suited for application in cases turning on
issues of division of authority among the political branches - separation of
power issues.
1. Limited Functionality of the Baker Factors Generally
At least one commentator has suggested that the factors are altogether
useless, and he provided an interesting analysis of each individual factor
which seems germane to this discussion.'9 2 To review briefly, the factors
are a "textually demonstrable commitment," a "lack of judicially . . . man-
ageable standards," an "initial policy determination" that is inappropriate
for the judiciary to make, a "lack of respect" for the political branches, an
"unusual need for unquestioning adherence" to decisions made, and "po-
tentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements."1 93 The
first and second factors are reasonably self explanatory, and their role in
the PMC cases is clear enough. Regulation and control of the armed forces
is constitutionally delegated to the Legislative and Executive branches,'9 4
and a court generally lacks the standards to adjudicate military matters,
while the military has its own rules, and its own courts for interpreting
them.195
191. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973) (narrowly holding that composition,
training, equipping and control of a military force are matters wholly vested in Congress and the Execu-
tive, subject only to electoral accountability, and that even in a time when the political question doc-
trine is dwindling it is still very much applicable in matters regarding express authority of the political
branches); Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (executive branch's power to conduct
foreign affairs); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (state citizens' right to control their form of govern-
ment ; federal legislature's power to recognize the state's government; and the executive branch's
power to call out the militia in cases of insurrection).
192. See Pettinato, supra note 166.
193. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
194. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14, 16; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
195. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S 733, 743 (1974). .
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Under Pettinato's analysis of the third factor, the courts must consider
whether the case involves a provision of the Constitution that is self-exe-
cutingl96 or non-self-executing, and whether the respective political branch
has executed a law or policy pursuant to a non-self executing provision. 197
Once a political branch acts, its actions must conform to the Constitution,
but in the case of a non-self executing provision which a political branch
has not executed the courts may be required to defer.198 In the PMC cases
the provisions are non-self executing, requiring some action by the political
branches, and the Legislative and Executive branches have acted and de-
termined that it is the policy of the United States Armed Forces to enlist
the aid of private contractors for logistical support under the authority of
LOGCAP.199 Thus, there is no need for the judiciary to make, nor wait for,
a policy determination that is best left to the political branches. And con-
trary to the fears of the district court in Lane 1, resolution of tort claims
against private companies who contracted with the government has no
bearing on the policy of utilizing private contractors for logistical military
support. 200 Any effect that a resolution favorable to the plaintiffs might
have, would likely be a market response on the part of the civilian compa-
nies and should not be weighed in determining the justiciability of the is-
sue.201 Even though such a result may have serious political ramifications,
including the possibility of a reconsideration of the underlying policy, the
Supreme Court has made clear that political "overtones" of a decision does
not warrant dismissal under the political question doctrine.202
The fourth factor is superfluous, and should probably be abandoned
altogether. If lack of respect were a valid reason for barring adjudication,
the judiciary would be hard pressed to pass judgment on the Constitution-
ality of laws, a task which is generally accepted to be a core function of the
judiciary.203 While the wisdom of using a "lack of respect" as a factor in
any political question analysis is beyond the scope of this note, the factor
should be jettisoned in PMC cases, because the issues concern actions by
military contractors and not actions by, or at the direction of, the political
branches. 204 The fifth factor is rarely applied 205 and the PMC cases are no
exception.
196. A self-executing provision can be judicially enforced without waiting for any action on the




199. U.S. Army Reg. 700-137, at 1-1.
200. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 563 (5th Cir. 2008).
201. See id. at 563 n.6 ("impact . . . on a civilian company's willingness to contract with the
military is not a factor that we may use to deny Plaintiffs a forum in federal court")
202. Japan Whaling Assoc v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
203. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
204. Some would argue that military contractors' actions are indirectly under the control of the
political branches, where they are generally subject to the military's direction. However, that argument
assumes too much and neglects the fact that the contractors are civilian organizations that engage in
arm's length negotiations with the political branches, and are only subject to the control of the political
branches to the extent that they agree to be as evidenced by negotiated contractual provisions.
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The sixth and final factor is similar to the fourth factor in that literal
application of the factor would mean that any case where the courts adjudi-
cate the "excesses of the political branches" 206 could potentially be dis-
missed on political question grounds, an unseemly result and one surely not
intended by Justice Brennan in formulating the factor test. A reasonable
interpretation of the word "embarrassing" as used in the sixth factor im-
plies application to actions of international relations.207 Pettinato main-
tains that foreign relations are the primary motivating force behind the
sixth factor because the Constitution expressly places authority over for-
eign affairs in the political branches, and because multifarious pronounce-
ments in the foreign affairs arena makes the political branches actions
more complex and thus more difficult.208 Simply put, the framers intended
the political branches to have discretion in foreign affairs. 2 0 9 However,
resolving a claim arising from the alleged negligence of a PMCs does not
involve foreign affairs in a way that presents a danger of multifarious pro-
nouncements - either the companies are liable for torts or not. The mere
fact that the wrong occurred on foreign soil is not sufficient to invoke the
sixth Baker factor, or even make it necessary for consideration.
2. Unnecessary Political Question Complication in Military Contractor
Cases
Whatever the case may be against use of the Baker factors generally,
the analysis of the factors outlined above certainly evinces a need to ad-
dress the limits of their application in PMC cases. Courts have interpreted
the textual commitment factor broadly,210 but such an interpretation is
overly cautious and prejudicial in the PMC cases. The relevant text of the
Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o raise and
support Armies[;] . . . [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces; ... [and] [t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States;" 2 11 and that "The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States." 212 The text very clearly vests in the political
branches authority to direct the affairs of the armed forces, but that author-
ity is not unlimited. Extending the textual commitment regarding military
205. Pettinato, supra note 166, at 75 (noting that the Supreme Court has never applied this factor;
and speculating that Justice Brennan derived this factor from Luther, 48 U.S. at 44, where the Court
"found the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to the political branches' decision based on the
critical timing of the situation.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 76.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 76-77.
210. See, e.g., Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1279, 1281 (the fact that the Army retained control
over the planning and execution of the convoys displayed a "textually demonstrable commitment").
211. U.S. CONsT. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 12, 14, 16.
212. U.S. CONsr. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
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affairs to private contractors, if followed to its logical conclusion, is similar
to allowing contractors to raise defenses of sovereign immunity or allowing
them to avail themselves of federal preemption statutes.1
The prudential considerations in PMC cases tend to center around the
difficulty in applying a judicial standard to issues that are intertwined with
military affairs, without showing a lack of respect for the political branches
or impugning political policy makers. However, this is a false concern be-
cause PMCs are divorced from the political branches, connected only be
arm's length negotiated contracts. It was the free market, not political
processes of the government, that gave rise to PMCs, and therefore the
PMCs should be subject to the same controls as the rest of the free market,
including civil liability.
The district court in Lane 1 held that three of the factors were impli-
cated, citing the Executive branch's responsibility for commanding the
armed forces; the lack of judicial standards for determining whether the
Army supplied KBR with adequate information regarding the routes the
trucks were to take; and the need for the court to make a policy decision
about the wisdom of using civilian contractors in a war zone.214 Yet despite
the district court's compelling arguments, the Fifth Circuit found that none
of the factors were inextricable at that stage of the litigation.215 The latter
court admitted that subsequent revelation of facts might very well reveal
the inextricableness of these or other factors.
Perhaps the district court had to reach unnecessarily to come to the
conclusion that questions of military authority controlled the case. But
perhaps also, in its reversal, the Fifth Circuit had to oversimplify to come to
the conclusion that military authority is not readily at issue in the case. The
logic behind both courts' decisions is the direct result of an application of
the Baker factors which does not leave much room for discretion, precisely
when discretion should be exercised.
The issue of military authority and the correlative Baker factor, a tex-
tually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate political branch, cannot
be ignored, but it should not be dispositive. What neither court considered
is that despite the presence of a textually demonstrable commitment, the
issues in this case could be resolved around this factor.
a. The Eleventh Circuit: McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.
In McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., the defendant contractor,
Presidential, sought to bar adjudication on, inter alia, political question
213. Several courts have expressly held that contractors may not avail themselves of these doc-
trines of non-liability that apply to the government and government agencies are not available to gov-
ernment contractors. E.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007);
contra Koohi v. United States., 976 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that government defense
contractors who supply weapons may be able to use the "combatant activities" exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act).
214. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 559-63 (5th Cir. 2008).
215. Id. at 568 (acknowledging the potential that discovery and later evidence may reveal an issue
which the courts would be ill-equipped to adjudicate).
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grounds for a lawsuit arising from the death of three Army servicemen who
were killed when a plane operated by Presidential's pilots crashed en route
from northern Afghanistan to western Afghanistan. 2 16 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit refused to dismiss the case on political question grounds at the stage of
litigation the case was in, holding that Presidential had failed to show that
the decisions of the Army would be implicated in the resolution of the
plaintiffs' tort claims, and further that Presidential had failed to show that
the case involved a judicially unmanageable standard.2 1 7 The court did ac-
knowledge, however, that in applying a standard of care it would have to
account for the "less than hospitable environment."218
b. Other District Court Cases
The Middle District of Alabama ruled a case justicable where a civilian
worker riding as a passenger in a government contractor truck was injured
due to the alleged negligence of the driver who was driving at a very high
rate of speed.219 The district court for the Northern District of Georgia
held a similar case to be justiciable where a serviceman serving as an escort
to a civilian contractor convoy was killed when he was thrown from the
vehicle after the driver, a KBR employee, lost control. 220 But the district
court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed a case on political ques-
tion grounds where a soldier who was escorting a supply convoy died when
his vehicle was struck from behind by another vehicle operated by a KBR
driver.221
In a distinguishable case, but one that, like the others, involves cooper-
ation of the military and government contractors, the district court for the
Southern District of Texas222 dismissed on political question grounds a case
where a civilian contractor was killed by suicide bomber who infiltrated a
dining facility (DFAC) at a Forward Operating Base in Mosul, Iraq.22 3 The
contract workers' survivors filed suit alleging negligence on the part of
KBR for, inter alia, failing to adequately secure the dining facility and fail-
ing to warn occupants that no security measures had been taken on the part
of KBR.2 24 The district court concluded that the case constituted a nonjus-
ticiable political question because the LOGCAP225 contract did not specify
that the defendants were responsible for security at the DFAC; because the
court could not determine what constitutes reasonable and adequate force
protection at a DFAC on a military base; and because resolution would
require the court to "substitute its judgment for that of the military" on the
216. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1336.
217. Id. at 1360, 1364.
218. Id. at 1364.
219. Potts v. Dyncorp Int'l, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
220. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Serv., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
221. Whitaker v. Kellog, Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
222. The same court that handed down the decisions in the three cases that were consolidated into
Lane 2 on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
223. Smith v. Halliburton Co.. No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
224. Id. at *1.
225. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.
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issue of adequate force protection, and examine the policy of centralized
military dining facilities.226 The court went out of its way to impute the
issues raised in the complaint to the Army, when none of the claims actu-
ally questioned military policy or procedure at all. It was this same court
that handed down the decisions in Fisher, Smith-Idol, and Lane 1.
The obvious problem on the face of all these decisions is the court's
invocation of the political question doctrine based on issues that the plain-
tiffs' do not raise and evidence that has not even come to light. A less
obvious problem, and one that persists throughout the PMC cases, is the
failure of the judiciary to recognize the peculiarity of these cases in relation
to the body of political question cases. The PMC cases merely allude to the
doctrine, whereas all of the other cases discussed in this note implicate it
directly - involving either some act or omission of a political branch, or an
act or omission of a body subject to the authority of a political branch. The
PMC cases involve neither. Therefore, it would seem incongruous to apply
the traditional six-factor test to such a non-traditional line of cases.
C. A Different Approach
1. Departure from the "Ritualistic Incantations" of Baker
As Robert Pushaw plainly stated, "[i]nstead of its ritualistic incanta-
tion and application of the Baker factors, the Court should simply have
held [in INS v. Chadha 227 that Article I's provisions delineating the proce-
dures for enacting statutes are as amenable to judicial review as any other
part of the Constitution, and that nothing in the Constitution's structure,
theory, or history rebuts this presumption."228 He could not have stated a
more concise, or correct, proposition with respect to the Baker approach.
Perhaps the answer to the inconsistency of the Baker approach, as Pushaw
suggests, is to abandon it in favor of a historical and structural analysis,
favoring judicial resolution absent a persuasive showing that political reso-
lution is the only means by which to preserve the integrity of the Constitu-
tional structure. Such evidence should be derived from history and
tradition, as well as a very limited prudential analysis.229 Following this
reasoning, it could be argued that historically and traditionally the judiciary
is especially suited to settle the types of claims presented in PMC cases, and
specifically Lane 2, where the claims rested on well-settled theories of tort
law. Furthermore, abdication of this authority to the political branches
would upset, rather than maintain the structural balance. Although pruden-
tial factors such as the military's judgment and the Executive branch's pol-
icy of utilizing PMCs weigh in favor of dismissal, they are outweighed by
the argument that the court is the traditional forum adjudicating tort
claims, and the interest of the persons injured in seeking redress is much
226. Smith, 2006 WL 2521326, at *6.
227. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (considering a claim that Congress failed to follow Arti-
cle I formalities in enacting legislation).
228. Pushaw, supra note 113, at 1198.
229. See generally Pushaw, supra note 113.
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stronger than any political branch's interest in avoiding controversy and
the possibility of criticism.2 3 0
2. A Balancing Test Using More Nuanced Prudential Factors
Two of the Baker factors are still essential to any political question
case. First, whether the case actually touches the textual commitment of
military authority to the political branches, and second, whether there is a
want for a judicially manageable standard for resolution. In addition to
these, the PMC cases call for a balancing of new prudential concerns that
are specifically geared towards the interplay between contractors and the
military. There are several doctrines and statutes affecting liability of both
military servicemen and government contractors, and the underlying ratio-
nale provides useful guidance for a prudential factor analysis of the politi-
cal question doctrine in the PMC cases, much more so than the Baker
factors.231 In several PMC cases, exemptions, preemptions, and exceptions
to liability have been raised as affirmative defenses by the contractors.232
Many of the prudential considerations critical to determining the jus-
ticiability of a PMC case are the same as the prudential concerns underly-
ing these non-liability doctrines 3 , while others are merely related by
correlation, but either way they provide a useful tool. Some of the particu-
larly relevant policies and considerations that underlie some of the excep-
tions to liability include the following: the idea that the relationship
230. See, e.g., Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
30, 2006) (holding, probably incorrectly, that lack of duty to protect is sufficient evidence to warrant
dismissal on political question grounds; in actuality the court reached the merits of the case in deciding
that the contractor owed no duty to the plaintiff, but couched its reasoning in political question terms);
see also Whitaker v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (holding,
again probably incorrectly, that the alleged negligence of a KBR driver who struck an Army vehicle
that stopped on a bridge was beyond the scope of judicial competence because it happened in a "com-
bat" zone, and because the convoy was organized by the military).
231. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2009) (exception to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity
for "any claim arising out of the combatant activities" of the armed forces); Defense Base Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1651(c) (applying Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.,
as sole remedy for claims arising from injury or death of, inter alia, employees of government contrac-
tors); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (the Feres Doctrine, holding that claims by ser-
vicemen for injuries incurred incident to service are barred from suit where the Sovereign immunity of
the United States applies to military servicemen's claims, in part due to the sensitive nature of military
functions).
232. E.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007) (unsuccessfully
attempting to raise derivative sovereign immunity under the Feres doctrine, infra n.309); Lessin v. Kel-
logg, Brown and Root, Inc., No. H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (unsuc-
cessfully attempting to raise "combatant activities" exception to FTCA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(j)); Fisher
v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (unsuccessfully attempting to raise exclusive
remedy provision of Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333
(9th Cir. 1992) (successfully raising affirmative defense of "combatant activities" exception to Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)).
233. In McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1354, the court declined to extend derivative Feres immunity to
private contractors sued by military personnel, but did note the parallels between the rationale for Feres
immunity and the prudential factors for political question analysis, where Feres immunity took into
consideration "sensitive military judgments."
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between the government and armed services personnel is "distinctively fed-
eral" and should be governed by federal authority rather than state law;234
the adequacy of federal compensation for service-related injury, coupled
with the difficulty and cost to the soldier to bring suit;2 3 5 the idea that the
judiciary is not competent to pass judgment on "sensitive military judg-
ments" ;236 a concern that judicial second-guessing of military decisions vio-
lates separation of powers; 237 and an important distinction between defense
contractors that provide the military with supplies, and contractors that
perform services.238
These types of considerations are exactly what the courts need to focus
on in PMC cases to determine whether the issue implicates the political
question doctrine. To the extent that the Baker factors are more of a one-
size-fits-all approach, the new PMC cases have outgrown them. The test
proposed below attempts to account for the need to particularize the pru-
dential side of the equation and provide more opportunities for adjudica-
tion rather than merely offering a way out. The first two of the Baker
factors remain relevant to the PMC cases, and political question cases in
general, but they should not alone be determinative of the outcome. The
new test would start off like the Baker test, but then proceed on a factor-
by-factor basis, weighing various considerations about the nature and char-
acter of the case against the presence, if any, of the remaining Baker
factors.
a. Application of the Relevant Baker Factors
The political question analysis in a PMC case should begin with the
first two Baker factors, although it is the concepts and not the factors per se
that warrant consideration. A textually demonstrable commitment of the
issue to a coordinate branch of government is the quintessential grounds
for dismissal, and as such should be determined first. The Eleventh Circuit
is of the opinion that a claim against a government contractor can never
implicate this factor because it is, by definition, not a coordinate branch of
government, and that in order for this factor to apply in PMC cases, the
party asserting political question bears the burden of proving that the court
would necessarily have to pass judgment on a military decision.2 39 This is a
tempting analysis, but one that should be left to the individual court to
decide. The district court that decided the Lane cases based its finding of a
textual commitment on the fact that war and foreign policy are committed
234. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 306
(1947)).
235. Id. at 145.
236. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1349-50.
237. Id. at 1350.
238. See Koohi, 976 F.2d at1337.
239. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1359-60.
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to the Executive and Legislative branches.240 While that is probably over-
stating the case, there may be a situation where the court finds that the
relationship between the contractor and the government is sufficiently and
"distinctively federal in character" 24 1 to warrant finding a textual commit-
ment. Therefore a bright line rule is not suggested.
Next, the court must determine whether there is a lack of judicially
manageable standards. This requires the court to consider first, the simple
nature of the claims, and second, whether there are military judgments un-
derlying the claims that require examination. The court should merely con-
sider whether a proper judicial standard exists with regard to the claims
and whether any military decisions may be implicated. The balancing fac-
tors will address the nature of the military decision, and whether it should
serve as a bar to adjudication. The Baker analysis ends here, and the mere
presence of any one factor should not necessarily be sufficient to bar the
claim on the basis of the political question doctrine. Rather, the court
should proceed to the next step - weighing the Baker factors against tradi-
tional prudential concerns in military cases.
b. Prudential Balancing Factors
The second part of the balancing test requires the court to consider the
nuances of the case and balance prudential concerns raised by civilians liv-
ing and working in a military setting, against the traditional separation of
powers concerns raised by military involvement in general.
First, the court should consider the nature of the claims asserted, and
whether the claims are such that judicial resolution is possible without de-
ciding "sensitive military judgments"2 4 2 of a kind that would seriously im-
pair or hinder the military's function.243 It is important to keep in mind
that just because a court may determine that a case calls into question a
sensitive military judgment, that is not an automatic bar on adjudication.
There should be some finding that the court lacks the expertise and re-
sources to resolve the issue, or that another branch of government is better
suited to resolve the issue.244
240. Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640-41 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Dickson v. Ford,
521 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975)).
241. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1950) (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 306 (1947)).
242. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1353 (defining "sensitive military judgment" as "quintessential or pe-
culiarly military judgments that courts should not hear as a matter of prudence, rather than a matter of
constitutional law.").
243. The function of the military was spelled out in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1947). The
"sensitive military judgment" rationale was suggested by the Eleventh Circuit in McMahon as possible
grounds for contractor's to raise derivative immunity. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1353.
244. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that resolution of
a factual dispute as to the nature and extent of the United States' military involvement in El Salvador
were "sensitive military matters," and resolution would require the court to consider conflicting evi-
dence and disputed facts which it did not have the resources or expertise to resolve, and that Congress
was better suited to the task).
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Second, the court should consider the role the contractor fulfills for
the military. In general there are two distinct types of government-military
contractors: defense contractors that supply weapons and other equipment;
and services contractors that provide logistical support.24 5 This factor may
reveal a federal character to the relationship between the contractor and
the government that warrants deference to the authority of the political
branches.2 46  Although contractors are not members of the military, de-
pending on the nature of the function they perform, the relationship may
be sufficiently similar.2 47
Third, a court should consider whether Congress or the Executive has
provided for exclusive relief in the type of claim at issue, and if so, whether
the contractor is entitled to it in the specific instance, and whether it is
sufficient to address the plaintiff's injuries. Since it is the province of the
judiciary to determine and protect individual rights, a court should have
the ability to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a Congressional or
Executive act that seriously affects the right of an individual to seek re-
dress. Several court opinions have struck down the "exclusive remedy" de-
fense, as well as government contractor's attempts to hide behind the
government's sovereign immunity, and those decisions should serve as gui-
dance in consideration of this third factor.24 8
As a final matter, courts should consider the relief requested by the
plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs request some form of injunctive relief, the court
might be justified in dismissing on political question grounds with a finding
that the requested relief would require the court to issue an order that is in
conflict with one of the political branches, or that would be the equivalent
of exercising a power not constitutionally delegated to the Judicial branch.
c. Political Question Analysis in the Context of Motions to Dismiss
It is important to note that a court is often considering the political
question doctrine in the context of a motion to dismiss, and if the complaint
makes out a claim on its face, a court should be hard pressed to find a
satisfactory reason for dismissing the case on political question grounds.
At the very least, the court should consider alternatives like in camera re-
view, and reviewing under seal in order to obtain the necessary information
245. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Fisher v. Hallibur-
ton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615-16 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
246. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44 (held that the "distinctively federal" character of the relationship
between a member of the armed services and the government warrants an exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, where the "scope, nature, legal incidents and consequence of the relation between persons
in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by fed-
eral authority.").
247. See, e.g., Fisher, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (holding that decisions involved in procuring supplies
from defense contractors involve "nuanced discretion and sophisticated judgment[s] by military ex-
perts," which are largely absent from the relationship with services contractors).
248. E.g., McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1353, 1331 (holding that government contractors are not entitled
to derivative sovereign immunity, despite one of the underlying rationale for such immunity being the
presence of "sensitive military judgments"); Fisher, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 613-14 (holding that a claim that
the defendant acted intentionally in causing harms is sufficient to defeat a defense of exclusive remedy
under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq.).
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to make an informed decision as to the prudential concerns that may war-
rant political question treatment. And it may be that discovery needs to
proceed to find an absolute showing that the political question doctrine is
implicated.
d. Predictability
In the wake of Baker, the judiciary has returned to an earlier era and
begun strongly favoring judicial review once again. After all, a majority of
the Supreme Court has only found two cases that constitute a political
question since Baker.24 9 The Court has not ruled on a PMC case, but the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Lane 2 falls in line with the re-emerging trend of
favoring judicial review. But the inconsistencies in application of the politi-
cal question doctrine in the PMC cases are somewhat troubling. The Fed-
eral District Court for the Southern District of Texas has held less obvious
cases to be justiciable and then turned around and ruled Fisher, Smith-Idol,
and Lane 1 nonjusticiable on arguably less justifiable grounds than what it
would have taken to dismiss earlier cases. In Lessin v. KBR, the district
court held justiciable a case where a member of the army stopped to assist
a civilian truck driver with a malfunctioning truck and was subsequently
injured by an act of alleged negligence on the part of the truck driver.2 5 0 It
seems ironic that the district court would find a case which turned on the
decision of military personnel to stop and assist a civilian justiciable, while
finding cases that turn wholly on the acts and omissions of civilians nonjus-
ticiable.
The need for predictability in this area is great. In fact, one of the ratio-
nales for political question treatment in PMC cases - i.e. that adjudication
would require judging the Executive branch's policy of using military con-
tractors, and thus would lead to the demise of PMCs - is actually undercut
by a body of case law that is so unpredictable. It is generally understood
that businesses prefer the known to the unknown, whether the known is
good or bad, because it allows for proper planning.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Lane v. Halliburton is a case that is indicative of a sea
change that needs to occur in the political question arena. For too long the
courts have relied on Baker v. Carr as the end all and be all for political
249. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (holding that challenges to impeachment
proceedings in the Senate present a nonjusticiable issue); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)
(narrowly holding that decisions pertaining to military force control, training and equipping are consti-
tutionally vested in the political branches). Several other cases have invoked the political question
doctrine with only a plurality. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (holding political
gerrymandering cases nonjusticiable).
250. Lessin was a member of the Army who was injured by a ramp assist arm on a truck when he
stopped to assist a civilian contract truck driver who had broken down by the side of the road. Lessin,
2006 WL 3940556, at *1. The complaint alleged negligence on the part of the private contractor in
failing to adequately maintain and service the truck, as well as failure to adequately supervise the
driver. Id. at *2.
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question analyses, despite the clear signs that its methodology yields incon-
sistent and often incorrect decisions, especially in PMC cases. The ten-
dency of several district courts to declare PMC cases nonjusticiable
suggests one of two things: the political question doctrine is gaining ground;
or the district courts are playing political hot potato with cases that should
be decided. If the former is true it should serve as a warning sign that the
courts are taking the doctrine too far, sacrificing individuals' rights in the
name of politics.25 1 And if the courts are using Baker to punt politically
sensitive cases, then it should be a sign that Baker needs to be reevaluated.
Either way, a more nuanced approach that favors judicial review and bal-
ances the prudential factors with the functional factors is warranted in or-
der to give the courts the ability to consider factors specific to the types of
issues that surround these claims against PMCs. Whether or not the politi-
cal question doctrine should be scrapped in its entirety and reformulated is
beyond the scope of this note, but the phenomenon in the PMC cases is
likely not an isolated incident of misapplying Baker.
251. See Fritz W. Scharp, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L. J. 517, 596 (1996) ("it is important that, with very few exceptions, the doctrine has not been
permitted to gain a permanent foothold at the core of the Court's constitutional responsibility for the
protection of individual rights and for the determination of conflicts of competence") (emphasis
added).
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